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INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communications may be exalted or discouraged by
both legal and social norms. Most democracies sanctify the secret
ballot, most law schools encourage anonymity as to the identity of
students in both the grading of examinations and the evaluation of
courses, most charities and ethicists welcome and even idealize
anonymous philanthropy, and few readers object to pen-named
novels. In contrast, voting by elected representatives (and by
American judges) is public, juror votes are normally discoverable
after a verdict is in, and anonymous telephone calls as well as
unsigned, critical interpersonal notes are strongly discouraged by
social norms.
Such lists and comparisons suggest a number of lines of inquiry.
One puzzle is suggested by the title of this Article. If anonymity
encourages some communications, so that it can be a useful tool,
then why do many social conventions discourage anonymity? It is,
for example, mysterious that so many businesses solicit anonymous
criticism through suggestion boxes and customer evaluation forms
but that so few people think that anonymous notes, containing
constructive criticisms with comparable probability, are welcome by
friends and neighbors. There is also the obvious positive puzzle of
why and when anonymity is acceptable. I will suggest that social
norms go beyond formal legal rules in anticipating alternative
methods of communication through intermediaries with certain
characteristics. These alternatives may be desirable because they are
more reliable than anonymous communications and yet unlikely to
be easily chilled. Legal rules governing anonymity, as we will see,
are less amenable to case-by-case application and are, therefore, less
compromising than social norms.
I. EXPLAINING CONVENTIONS GOVERNING ANONYMITY
A. Chilling and Reliability
1. Anonymity to Encourage Communication
Anonymity implicates two countervailing forces. If parties with
valuable information can choose between making anonymous and
nonanonymous communications, it is likely that they will convey
more (or simply more accurate) information than they would in a
world where anonymous communications are effectively barred by
social conventions or enforceable legal rules. Anonymity allows
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communication without retribution. This straightforward intuition
is reflected in the business practice of asking customers for infor-
mation but indicating that a respondent can remain unidentified.
The business, or potential recipient, recognizes that more informa-
tion will be forthcoming if communicators can choose whether to
be anonymous or not. Some respondents may think that their
communications will be rewarded, but others may fear unwanted
requests for additional information or even confrontations with the
subjects of their criticisms. This intuition about the gain associated
with anonymity is also found in the practice of offering rewards for
the return of missing items with "no questions asked."
The institution of the secret ballot and the convention of
unsigned student evaluations of teachers may serve as additional
examples of anonymity designed to encourage communication. One
is compelled by legal rules and the other by common practice, or
social norms, but in both cases identification might chill responses
because communicators might fear retaliation or confrontation.
Note that these practices are explained (ex post) rather than
predicted; if anonymity were barred or abhorred in these settings,
it would be easy to say that identifiability discouraged corruption or
improper motives. Anonymity may encourage honest communica-
tion, but (even in the same settings) it may also stimulate dishonest,
corrupt, or simply socially undesirable decisionmaking or communi-
cations. I return to these matters, and to all these examples, below.
For the present, I consider only simpler cases where it appears to be
unambiguously desirable, both privately and socially, to encourage
communication.
2. Identifiability to Encourage Reliability
Anonymity may encourage communication, but nonanonymity,
or identifiability, will often raise the value of a communication to its
recipient. Identification can be a useful signal, and it may promote
accountability; but it may also be sufficient simply to say that the
information contained in the identification of the source of a
communication is itself of value to the recipient. In some contexts,
the value (to the recipient) of identification has more to do with
marketing or other forms of adaptation than with intrinsic value or
reliability. Thus, a firm may seek information about the prefer-
ences, income, or residence of retail customers, but this information
is most often relevant when making decisions regarding future
business locations, advertising strategies, sales of mailing lists, and
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the like. It is the fact (and volume) of sales that provides feedback
as to quality, price, and past marketing decisions, and these sales
rarely lose much value if they are unidentifiable. In other settings,
however, identification is critical to the value of a communication.
Generally speaking, the value of identification (of the source of
information) is greater the more costly it is for the recipient
independently to evaluate the accuracy of the communication.
Thus, the value of communications about the commission of a crime
or about another country's military secrets often increase enor-
mously with identification of the source of the communication.1
3. The Tradeoff Between Reliability and Communication
Anonymity may induce communicative activity, but, for a given
communication, anonymity is also likely to reduce its value to the
recipient. This tradeoff suggests why norms favoring, discouraging,
or making optional the use of anonymity might develop. Consider
the case where G, a guest in host H's home or a patron of H's
business, observes another guest or customer, P, pilfer an item
belonging to H. Especially where G is a social guest, G may feel
some moral obligation to confront P or inform H. 2 On the other
hand, G may choose to remain uncomfortably silent. A purely self-
interested G may even choose to blackmail P or extort from H; a
somewhat better behaved or more risk-averse G may choose to
intervene, if only because H, after discovering the theft, may be
suspicious of G (and other guests or patrons who were present
around the time of the now-discovered theft).- There are of course
costs associated with confronting P or informing H. If P has some
innocent explanation ("H had given me permission to take that
item, and I slipped it in my pocket because I had no other way to
I Conversely, communications such as "wash me" (found on one's car), "this
locker really smells," and "the enclosed tape recording will show you that your dog
barks all day while you are away" lose nothingin the way of reliability when delivered
anonymously.
' I raise but do not dwell on the different social norms in the guest and business
settings. It is more likely that the social host will not want the information known to
the guest, but it is also more likely that the social guest will feel an obligation to
report. Superficially this is something of a paradox, but the solution is probably that
some social hosts want the information more than business hosts (and can do more
with it), but the guest's problem is to know which kind of social host is present.
s G's selfish motive is unlikely to be the prevention of theft by P from G because
G can always refuse to admit P to G's home or business. In this example, I assume
that the host will be somewhat less suspicious of the guest who informs, although
there are settings where it is the other way around.
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carry it home"), P may take great offense at G's inquiry. And where
P is a wrongdoer, there are of course costs borne by G whether or
not G succeeds in causing P to right the wrong. Informing H may
be ideal, because H may be grateful and may cause P to return what
has been taken. But there is the danger that H will resent G, accuse
G, or announce G's accusation of P in a way that harms G.
Our host, H, may welcome a social norm against anonymity if H
attaches substantial value to identification and if H thinks that
guests such as G will not choose inaction when offered a stark
choice between full disclosure and no disclosure. But a different
host could either place less value on (source) identification or fear
a more substantial chilling effect from an anti-anonymity norm.
Relying only on the preceding analysis, I think we would expect no
strong social norm against anonymity. Alternatively, we might
expect some variety as to this norm across communities or in
somewhat different circumstances. I must return therefore to the
task of "explaining" the nearly universal anti-anonymity norm
governing this kind of situation.
4
B. The Limited Role of Consent
The relevance of the host's preferences in the previous exam-
ple suggests that anonymity may follow hypothetical consent by the
recipient. Indeed, consent (whether implied or explicit) can easily
explain the acceptability of anonymous communications that are
entirely positive in substance. Valentine's Day cards are often
anonymous, as are some notes and apples received by teachers. The
positive nature of these communications (that is, so long as they do
not go so far as to raise the fear of unwanted behavior) allows us to
imply consent. Most of us prefer flattery in some volume. The
social convention can be seen as providing an outlet for or even a
limit on such positive feelings, and the convention reassures both
sender and recipient. In the case of Valentine's Day, the social
4 1 argue below that even if G, the potential informer, cares for (or interacts
repeatedly with) H, the recipient, so that G tries to internalize H-'s sentiments about
the value of information, it is difficult for G to assess the relative increase in H's
disutility from anonymity where close friends or relatives are concerned as compared
to Hs disutility from receiving no information at all from this group. Thus, if I learn
thatA detests my best friend, B, I am not sure whether B wants that information, and
I am fairly sure that if I guess wrong, in either direction, I am likely to wound B
seriously. The bond between us produces some information about preferences, but
it also raises the costs of error.
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norm may even serve the purpose of encouraging these communica-
tions in a way that increases private and social utility.
5
Consent may also have something to do with occasions for
applause or, less pleasantly, for hisses and jeers. A performer
implicitly "consents" to applause, though it be anonymous, but it is
interesting that arising out of this convention are such things as
vocal exclamations ("Bravol") and standing ovations, which might be
seen as attempts by some communicators to escape anonymity and
even to earn individual credit. Hissing and catcalling are thought
to be rude, perhaps because most performers would not consent to
such critical anonymous feedback; but inasmuch as there are
ballparks and even classrooms where this sort of communication is
accepted, the consent idea is perhaps too malleable to do much
good. There is even the possibility that jeering aloud at a sporting
event is more acceptable than is hissing at a lecture because the
hisser need not alter his or her facial expression and may therefore
escape identification.
6
5 More overt affection might be unwanted by both parties.
Charitable giving provides another example of activity that might both be
stimulated by the option of anonymity and regarded as consensual even when, or
especially when, anonymous. The substance of the message is positive, except for the
fact that an individual recipient might prefer not to know the identity of his or her
benefactor. See generally R. MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE LAWS OF HEBREWS RELATING
TO THE POOR AND THE STRANGER (James W. Peppercorne trans., Pelham Richardson
1840) (exalting most of all gifts or loans that generate self-sufficiency and ranking as
second those gifts that are anonymous); THE KORAN, The Cow 2:271, at 363 (NJ.
Dawood trans., Penguin Books 1974) ("To be charitable in public is good, but to give
alms to the poor in private is better and will atone for some of your sins. Allah has
knowledge of all your actions."). The very existence of charitable organizations might
be explained as facilitating dual anonymity, at least between donor and recipient.
There are, however, also tax and monitoring explanations equal to the task.
Note that a donor and charity might consent to the former's anonymous gift, but
other charities may not because they would gain from information about who donates
how much and to which causes. In ex ante terms, this seems like an insignificant
problem for the consent notion.
Finally, one advantage of anonymous contributions is that the donor may wish
to avoid pursuit by this or other charities. But this is not a path worth pursuing in
developing a general theory because individual donors will usually be able to convince
the recipient to keep some information private.
' An anthropologist might go further and note that disapproval can also be
expressed by stomping feet and by such noises as "boo," which are more difficult to
discern than applause (which is more visible) or than the open-mouthed cheer of
"yay" or "hooray," with analogies in other languages. It may also be noteworthy that
a member of an audience who cheers or jeers is often identifiable to those sitting
nearby even if not so to the performer. Norms about anonymity may thus tie into the
availability of "intermediaries" as discussed below in part II.C.
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It is plainly the case that, where the recipient explicitly consents
to receive anonymous communications, there is little objection to
anonymity even if it attaches to critical communications.' If a
professor or a restaurant distributes evaluation forms to students or
patrons, indicating that anonymous feedback is expected (by putting
in no space for the communicator's name or by labeling such a
space as "optional"), the recipient can hardly object to the anony-
mous quality of stinging but apparently honest responses, even if
this sort of criticism might not have been expressed by identifiable
communicators. Explicit consent rarely extends to third parties who
are likely to be implicated in evaluations. Consent might, however,
be implied when these third parties are aware of the invitation to
communicate and, perhaps, where they also stand to gain from
these anonymous communications. For example, employees at a
restaurant might be thought to consent to anonymous comments
about their performance on suggestion cards left at the table by the
proprietor. Customers certainly seem as likely to complain about
their server as about the proprietor's menu selections. Similarly,
the etiquette of course evaluation forms is the same whether a
university requires that they be distributed to students or a
professor chooses to ask for evaluations.'
A variety of subtle consent arguments may illuminate these
conventions and the relationship between consent and identifi-
ability. It is possible that in most employer-employee-informer
settings, identifiability is of little value to the employee because
identifying a transient customer is unlikely to add much in the way
of reliability; when the cost of confrontation is taken into account,
the employee may prefer that communications be solicited in anony-
mous fashion. This may be so because the employee expects that
anonymity will bring about a greater increase in positive feedback
than in negative feedback (from customers who can use voice
without unpleasant confrontation). A waitress at a pancake house
learns little from the name of a critical patron. She might better
The same is true where the information is sensitive, rather than critical, but easy
enough to avoid. Thus, anonymity may be strategic, and even strategically
relinquished, by one who places personal ads in a newspaper. Responders, in turn,
are free to do the same, and both parties can be seen as consenting.
'These examples, and others to follow, also suggest that there is more to the
social convention than the idea that anonymity is generally treated with contempt
(even though the tradeoff between communication and reliability would sometimes
favor anonymity) because in the long run openness is an important check on
accuracy.
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defend herself to her employer if there are clues as to which
customer complained or when the offending coffee was poured, but
the content and date of the evaluation form is far more likely to
provide that information than is the name of the communicator. It
is possible that when there are no evaluation forms, customers are
more likely to speak up and to seek out the manager. Either way,
the employer can be seen as offering customers multiple feedback
options, with the employee actually preferring that customers
choose the anonymous method. Employers might like a system in
which patrons were told "If you are pleased, let us know by mail
(and we can choose how to use or withhold this information from
our employees who pleased you), but if you are disgruntled come to
the back office and let us know." Meanwhile, the employee might
like it best if adoring customers were invited to speak up and
disgruntled ones asked to use the mails. Social norms often exhibit
a kind of symmetry, and my intuition is that such symmetry operates
here. But my narrow point is simply that there is at least a story to
be told in which many employees consent to anonymous evaluations
running from their customers to their employers.
9
In other settings, third-party interests are sufficiently valued that
we do not pause to contemplate the likelihood of universal consent.
We welcome anonymous tips in order to prevent horrible crimes
because we value third parties' safety sufficiently to care not at all
about the question of whether the subject, which is to say the
criminal, consented to anonymous communications. We might
prefer identifiability for reasons of reliability, and we might prefer
as second best the informer's use of a reliable intermediary who
could vouch for the character of the informer while preserving
anonymity, but there is no legal or social norm against uninter-
mediated anonymity. In emergencies we take whatever information
we can get. Indeed, to the extent that informers are treated as
"snitches" within some subcultures, anonymity may there be
preferred to identifiability because an anonymous snitch seeks no
personal gain, while the identifiable snitch, or rat, is doubly
' Anonymity may also be preferred if it encourages local, rather than more
notorious, communication. A faculty member may welcome anonymous criticism
from students, although identifiable communications may be yet preferred if there
is a perception that an alternative available to the student or colleague is a trip to the
dean's office. Even more trivially, we may prefer that passers-by write "wash me" on
our dirty cars rather than express their disgust with notes to our colleagues or
neighbors. The graffiti is anonymous, but so is the owner of the car to most passers-
by.
THE ANONYMITY TOOL
despised for siding with the authorities against a peer and for
profiting in implicit or explicit ways.
Falling between these extremes, just where a predictive tool
might be useful, third-party interests are not easily assessed and
consent does not therefore seem terribly helpful in explaining
tolerances for anonymity. We might say that identification is
required of donors to a political campaign but not to most charities
because the recipient consents to anonymity in both cases while
third-party interests (in fighting corruption, for example) are much
greater in politics. But such cases almost inevitably concern legal
norms rather than social norms, if such a distinction can be granted,
and I defer discussion of legal rules to Part II. For the present, I
suggest simply that we should expect a good deal of variety where
third-party interests are concerned, and that one way to describe
this variety in required identifiability is with the absence of a kind
of consent.1" But I think it a mistake to put too much weight on
consent. Consent may help explain many of the settings where
anonymity is acceptable-because acceptability follows universal
consent almost as a matter of definition-but the challenge is to
distinguish among cases where either the recipient, subject, or
another affected party does not consent to anonymous communica-
tions. Consent is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
anonymity, and it does not seem helpful in hard cases or in areas
where variety is found.
C. Intermediation
1. Filtration As an Alternative to Anonymity
A central theme of this Article is that anonymity is a less
acceptable social practice where the informer can use an intermedi-
ary to avoid confrontation with the recipient and to convey
information about the reliability of the source. This sort of
intermediary can be thought of as filtering out the precise identity
"0 By variety, I mean that different legal systems will have different rules, and that
even a single legal system may have different strategies for fairly similar problems.
See generally Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in
Ancient and Modem Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REv. 235, 237-38 (1986) (positing that there
will be variety among legal systems when legal rules "are not compelled by behavioral
effects"); Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith
Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 45 (1987) (discussing the variety of ways different
legal systems deal with the problem of good-faith purchasers of stolen goods).
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of the original communicator but, at least ideally, preserving the
value normally attached to identifying that communicator (reliabil-
ity). The informer who chooses to use an intermediary will
normally be identifiable to the intermediary" but not to the
recipient; the intermediary can (as a matter of social norms)
normally choose whether to transmit the substance of the communi-
cation-without identifying its precise source-to the intended
recipient. This theme has normative, positive, and specific
predictive components, all arising out of the idea that anonymity is
a more useful tool where there is no substitute that both preserves
most of the advantages of anonymity, which is to say, encourages
communications that would be chilled by the requirement of
identifiability, and offers the recipient most of the gain normally
associated with identification.
In some cases, the intermediary encourages communications
and ultimately serves as a useful filter, even though the avail-
ability of the intermediary encourages some additional, unreli-
able communications. Investigative journalists who use inform-
ers, like broadcasters who welcome communications about unsolved
crimes, illustrate this sort of intermediation. These interme-
diaries can be seen as entrepreneurs who bear the costs of sifting
through an increased volume of communications in order to profit
from consumers who enjoy either gaining information about the
results of various communications or observing the intermediation
itself.
2. Evaluations
I have already referred to the familiar practice of students
evaluating their teachers. The communications are commonly
invited in an anonymous format, even though the fear of retribu-
tion-where there is also single-"blind," or anonymous, grading1
2-is
fairly low. In some universities there is even a requirement that
anonymous student evaluations be solicited and that these be
" We will see instances where there is value to "anonymous intermediation," but
for the present it is useful to think of the most straightforward filtering process. See
infra note 21.
" There is also something of a practice of students anonymously submitting
questions for a review session with their instructor. Here there is no need for
reliability, and a serious desire to increase communication. The social norm rises to
the occasion. It is interesting that sometimes such notes from students will begin
with "My study group is confused about...." The intermediation theme seems to
have permeated social instincts here.
THE ANONYMITY TOOL
factored in to the evaluation of faculty members. At the same time,
when committees focus on a faculty candidate for promotion or
tenure, it is common to supplement the information received from
these anonymous course evaluations with nonanonymous interviews
of students who have recently taken courses with the teacher who
is a candidate for promotion. These student interviewees are
identified to the interviewer"3 but not to the candidate, even if the
candidate reads the committee's report as part of, or following, the
evaluation process. Somewhat similarly, evaluative letters that are
solicited from faculty reviewers at other universities are normally
anonymous in the sense that the candidate either has no access to
these letters or reads them after the identities of these referees have
been obliterated. In contrast, the committee that solicits these
reviews, the university administrators who review promotion
decisions, and perhaps the faculty that votes on promotion can all
identify the communicator. These are straightforward examples of
what I will call intermediation, or filtration. Intermediation is
often a preferred alternative to anonymity. The information
s While impersonal interviews would be possible, there seems to be no reason for
such acoustical separation. Put differently, anonymity may provide "information" in
some settings, such as where there is the fear that identification will bias the listener.
In this context, anonymity cleanses the signal of previous associations. This is
presumably part of the argument for anonymous grading if not for anonymity in
general, or at least in the "public sphere." Compare Robert C. Post,'The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HAv. L. REV. 601, 640 (1990) (noting that anonymous
public discourse allows speakers to "divorce their speech from the social contextual-
ization which knowledge of their identities would necessarily create in the minds of
their audience") with Seth F. Kreimer, Sunligh Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991)
(discussingJohn Stuart Mills's objection to the use of the secret ballot) and Hendrik
D. Gideonse, Letter to the Editor, THE NEW REPUBLIC (n.d.) (on file with author)
(chastising an unnamed faculty member at Harvard for submitting an anonymous
opinion, said to be based on Harvard experience, because "[flor [an] opinion to be
attended to, it is crucial to know the source").
It is interesting that anonymous submissions or auditions are regularly sought in
architectural competitions, wine tastings, and orchestral hiring, but not in university
hiring nor in many other settings. There is, of course, often anonymous refereeing
of manuscripts for scholarly journals and university presses. The editor is an
intermediary who knows the identities of those who are involved, evaluates their
reliability, and has the power to withhold some information. There are studies of
how accurate reviewers are at guessing the identities of the authors of these
manuscripts. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, The Effects of Double-Blind Versus Single.Blind
Reviewing. Experimental Evidence from the American Economic Review, 81 AMER.
ECON. REV. 1041, 1051 (1991) (finding that 45.6% of authors of blind papers in
experiments could be identified).
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provided by these evaluators is more valuable when identities are
known, 4 but most of the reliability gain, if it can be called that, can
be captured simply by identifying each communicator to the
intermediary. 5
These examples do not on their own make the case for my
central thesis, but it may be useful to set much of it out at this
point. One claim or observation is that anonymity is an accepted
social practice not when it is complete but rather when there is
anonymity as to some recipients or subjects but identifiability to a
responsible intermediary. This sort of intermediation is found
acceptable where it encourages communication without an excessive
sacrifice of reliability. A more complicated claim is that complete,
or unfiltered, anonymity is most foul where the communicator could
have operated through an intermediary. The contrapositive claim
is that where intermediation is unavailable anonymity is more
tolerable. The examples involving student and peer reviews support
the first assertion.
14 The gain may come from knowing the student, from knowing the student's
grade in the course given by the faculty member in question, from the presence of
a bond between the interviewer and interviewee, or from the ability of the interviewer
to discern the mood or attitude of the interviewee towards the candidate or other
matters. All these possibilities have counterparts in other settings where the source
of a communication is identified.
'5 It is of course possible that the student-interviewee and faculty member who is
being evaluated have a special relationship, negative or positive, such that the filtering
process destroys the constructive (rather than evaluative) value of the communication.
My point is not that filtering is either a perfect substitute (with collateral benefits) or
a dominant strategy, but rather that it is plausible that on average its positive affect
on communicative activity greatly exceeds the losses it generates in terms of reduced
reliability. In turn, my claim is that this conclusion may lead to a distaste for
anonymity, at least where intermediation is possible.
Note, finally, that in the case of students' evaluations there may be no net loss
in reliability from intermediation (with the anonymity of the interviewee preserved
insofar as the subject is concerned) because a subject who was informed of the
identities of interviewees might be expected to issue warnings or vetoes with regard
to interviewees known to have negative sentiments but to say nothing when the
potential interviewees had positive bonds. Nevertheless, it is apparently common for
tenure candidates to have the opportunity to veto proposed outside faculty reviewers.
Perhaps the asymmetry is mitigated by the professional and ethical practice of
disclosing one's relationship with the candidate at the outset of a review letter. Still,
I have never seen an outside review letter in which the author reveals that he or she
had previously communicated to the candidate enthusiasm for the latter's work (so
that the candidate may discourage the use of some reviewers without discouraging the
use of those known to be positively inclined).
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3. Intermediation and Consent
I have suggested that intermediation plays an important role in
preserving much of the reliability that anonymity sacrifices. Even
where reliability is lost through anonymity, consent may open the
way for its acceptability. In some settings, consent may be revealed
through intermediation, and intermediation may encourage rather
than discourage anonymous communications.
Consider the consent that is often implied where the return of
lost or stolen property is concerned. Someone who finds or who
himself stole something belonging to another can normally return
the property anonymously. Put more academically, we might disap-
prove of the theft or of the failure to return what has been found,
but we so prefer the return of the item (sans confession) to its
retention that we cannot say that there is a social norm against
returning the item anonymously (simply because of the stronger
social preference for a world with no theft or with return combined
with confession). 6
Where the owner seeks to encourage return by promising a
reward, complete anonymity becomes difficult if not impossible.
The owner may promise "no questions asked," but the "communica-
tor," or finder, or thief-turned-finder, runs a substantial risk in
claiming the reward. An obvious solution for nearly all the involved
parties, assuming the owner honestly prefers an increased probabil-
ity of return to an increased chance of apprehension, is for the
finder to use a reliable intermediary who is beyond suspicion and
who can effect the exchange of missing property for reward.17 We
might take the familiar "no questions asked" expression to mean
that an honest intermediary who is approached by a finder should
not on principle decline to serve as intermediary, inasmuch as the
owner consents to favoring the value of a return more than that of
discouraging theft, searching for the thief, or administering a
lecture on integrity. There is in this way a modest role played by
16 The owner surely consents to the anonymous return. We could imagine a world
or a norm that strongly discouraged making or accepting an anonymous return in
order to encourage a return with confession. It is thus conceivable that third-party
interests against theft could vitiate consent. We can either assert that our own social
experiences suggest nearly universal consent (as a kind of second- or third-best
solution) or repeat the idea that consent is an ad hoc, ex post explanation.
" I frame this solution in terms of the finder's choosing intermediation because
an owner who named an intermediary in order to encourage returns would often
frighten away a finder who feared that this intermediary would prove to be an agent
of the owner and would not preserve the finder's anonymity.
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intermediaries in facilitating anonymity (and therefore some activity
or communication) where the recipient consents.
It is tempting to expand on this link between intermediation and
consent with the suggestion that intermediation may also serve to
assess consent. Intermediation might not only facilitate consensual
transactions but also (earlier in conceptual time) establish the
existence or absence of consent. Imagine, for example, that A
hesitates to present an acquaintance, B, with evidence that B's child
has a gambling or substance-abuse problem. A might turn to B's
friend, C, if only to assess whether B is the sort of person who
wishes to receive this information. C may be a close enough friend
of B that, if C chooses to relay the information to B without
revealing its source, it is unlikely that B will suspect that C is a
spineless informer simply pretending to be an intermediary. And
C may instead decide that B would prefer not to receive this
communication from any quarter, or C may choose to encourage A
to communicate directly with B." In this sort of case A may be
encouraged by social norms to avoid anonymity not-or not simply-
in order to encourage direct communication with the recipient but
rather to encourage intermediation by a party with better informa-
tion about the recipient's preferences. Put differently, we have seen
that anonymity may be discouraged because the communicator can
at a low cost provide the recipient with better reliability (and little
loss in the volume of communication) by using an intermediary, and
now we see that another gain from intermediation might be the
intermediary's ability to assess the recipient's preferences. It is
possible that an intermediary would advise the informer to proceed
anonymously, and my sense is that this sort of anonymous commu-
nication would not be regarded as cowardly or as socially inappro-
priate-at least as compared to one sent without the advice of an
intermediary who knew the recipient well.
One problem with this view of intermediation as a means of
assessing consent is that knowing someone well does not mean that
one can predict his or her preferences with respect to receiving
information about sensitive topics. Such situations do not often
"8 C may also decide to ask B whether B would like information that has come to
C's attention regarding B's family. The problem with this sort of hypothetical
question, of course, is that the question produces anxiety. B can hardly turn down
the offer and continue life as before. A more general point is that gossip may serve
a useful social and private function, but many people would (if they could choose)
prefer not to be the subject of any gossip.
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arise and do not much resemble other observed behavior. If so,
intermediation may preserve reliability, but it does not make
headway on the consent front. Another problem is that intermedia-
tion can make things worse, which is to say the recipient may have
objected to intermediation itself because the information is now in
the hands of one additional party and this may serve further to
humiliate the recipient. If the informer chooses an intermediary
that is sufficiently distant from the recipient or subject so as to
avoid the risk of humiliation, then this intermediary is also unlikely
to have any special perspective on the likelihood of consent.
One way to focus on the consent aspect of intermediation is to
remove the reliability gain by considering an example where
complete anonymity does not sacrifice reliability. If A has stumbled
across a photograph of B's child engaging in a crime, A's use of an
intermediary, C, is unlikely to improve reliability because the picture
is worth a thousand words. On the other hand, C may know enough
about B and B's parenting experiences to have some insight into the
question of whether B (or even the child) would want the picture
sent. B may wonder about the sender's motives, but a well-written
note from the sender will do as much to alleviate these anxieties as
a guarded report from C. And any comparative advantage enjoyed
by C in assessing B's reaction to receiving such information,
anonymous or otherwise, is likely to be offset by the added anxiety
experienced by B in learning that both (unnamed) A, and now C,
know of B's problem. In some situations C (and A) may have the
additional option of confronting not B but perhaps B's child,
threatening disclosure to the parent (or to another suitable party)
unless the wrongdoer takes a variety of rehabilitative steps. I think
this is the best case for intermediation, but again I think it rare that
a chosen intermediary will have enough insight into B's family to
improve things much. I am inclined to conclude that intermedia-
tion is only useful where it avoids the stark tradeoff between chilling
and reliability-and that it does little for consent. But perhaps the
more academic thing to say is that the matter is sufficiently murky
that we should be unsurprised (or even pleased) that no strong
social norm has evolved to govern this sort of situation. People who
find themselves in A and C's circumstances report serious doubts as
to how to proceed. Only the most optimistic observer would say
that all ends well when these people continue to pass the buck by
consulting other "intermediaries," thereby increasing the probability
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that social gossip will in the long run deter misbehavior and
generate social harmony. 
t
4. Pseudonyms
a. Publishers As Intermediaries
Consider next the use of pseudonyms by authors of fiction and
nonfiction. Pseudonymously written work often goes beyond
anonymity either because the fact that a communicator seeks to
remain unidentified can itself provide information to the recipient
or because the pseudonym affirmatively misleads the recipient. A
reader might, for example, gain insight from the fact that an
author's pen name entailed a gender switch, or more accurately a
paper gender switch. But in many cases a pseudonym promotes a
kind of neutrality or avoids identification not by one's readers but
rather by one's employer or family.21 Most readers will not feel
wounded by this kind of anonymity, although there is something of
a troubling asymmetry in the fact that the writer might be more
likely to choose to remain anonymous if the work offends or fails to
gain acclaim.
The general acceptability of pseudonyms, even where an author
attempts to mislead readers, supports the intermediation theme
because the pseudonymous strategy is pursued under the publisher's
watchful eye. The publisher vouches in a sense for the harmless or
even noble intentions of the author.2' The pseudonymously
'9 Indeed, because gossip is used to regulate information within a relatively small
sphere of intimate social relationships, appropriate behavior on the part of B and C
may well vary according to the norms followed by B and C's peers. On the role of
gossip in society, see generally Maryann Ayim, Knowledge Through the Grapevine.
Gossip as Inquiry, in GOOD Gossip 85 (Robert F. Goodman & Aaron Ben-Ze'ev eds.,
1994) (describing gossip as an effective method of communication); Nicholas Emler,
Gossip, Reputation, and Social Adaptation, in GOOD GOSSIP, supra, at 117 (describing
gossip as integral to patterns of human social structure).
" The social acceptability of this practice derives either from the sense that
communication is encouraged while the author's acquaintances cannot be hurt much
by what they do not know or from a devaluation of the sentiments of disapproving
and deceived observers.
21 The intermediation theme suggests that we might always like publishers to be
identified. But inasmuch as First Amendment and other concerns might prevent
strong-form regulation of all publishers, it is noteworthy that identification is required
where the government has some excuse for regulation. See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3685
(1994) (requiring identification of publishers who enjoy preferential postal rates for
periodicals); see also Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 312 (1913)
(upholding a statute requiring disclosure in return for postal discounts and expressing
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written Federalist Papers are perhaps the best example of this idea.2
Reporters who use unnamed sources, or who themselves write
under bylines, reflect the same social norm. Reporters' sources are
taken up in Part II.D below, in the context of a discussion of the
legal regulation of social norms. I embark on something of a detour
now, by inquiring further into pseudonyms and intermediation by
publishers. The central strand of this Article can be rejoined in Part
II, which turns to legal norms governing anonymity.
b. Signalling
I have already come close to suggesting that the examples
presented thus far reflect a robust social norm such that communi-
cators whose anonymity and information are filtered through
responsible intermediaries are regularly tolerated. Pseudonymous
publications, however, might be interesting or different because
false claims of authorship can affirmatively mislead a reader. If an
author's anonymity and perspective are made explicit, as in "written
by 'X,' a detective in the L.A.P.D.," there is little more to say
inasmuch as the publisher presumably warrants that the author is
indeed as advertised. Anonymity may protect the author (or simply
intrigue the reader) while filtration preserves much of the reliability
that is normally associated with identification. If there is intentional
misidentification, as where 'W has never seen the inside of a police
station, acceptability depends on what is intended and accomplished
by this fib. There are easy cases where misrepresentation is simply
offensive or even legally actionable, and the complicity of an
intermediary makes the matter worse rather than better.
The use of pen names to misidentify authors is especially
common with respect to gender, and especially controversial with
respect to race and ethnicity, because the author's "true" perspec-
tive may be misidentified. In these circumstances it seems that
readers (once informed) are likely to object more strenuously to an
author who pretends to be an "insider" than they are to an author
whose pen name or other suggestions mislead them into thinking
the author is an "outsider." A Senator or a diplomat or a presiden-
tial advisor might, with little objection, attach a pen name to a
mystery novel involving political or military intrigue.23 Similarly,
the public's right to know the origin of information).
' See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
2 See ADRIAN ROOM, A DIcTIONARY OF PSEUDONYMS AND THEIR ORIcINs, WITH
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a lawyer or judge involved in a case might be the unidentified
author of a book about that case.2 4 When the book proves success-
ful and the author's identity is revealed, the public reaction appears
to be positive or neutral. The potential for objectionable strategic
behavior, which is to say the likelihood that the author would have
remained anonymous had the book been a commercial disaster or
had it proved to be offensive to a substantial subset of readers,
seems offset by the likelihood that the author may have chosen a
pen name in order to compete on an equal playing field with less
well-positioned authors. This form of pseudonymity or misidentifi-
cation may, after all, invite honest criticism and sacrifice sales to
buyers who would purchase the book only because of the celebrity
status of the author. It is therefore arguable that the insider who
pretends to be an outsider offends no social norm because any
strategic gain to the author is more than offset by the perceived
losses, or even the possibility of noble alms on the author's part.
In contrast, the outsider who misleads readers by pretending to
be an insider can easily benefit from the charade and normally
offers the reader no corresponding gain. At best, the reader might
gain self-knowledge, but it is unlikely that the reader would
hypothetically have consented to this style of education. My sense
is that greater offense is taken when the misrepresentation is of
"insider" status. Thus, an author who pretends to be a member of
an ethnic or racial group when writing about that group is likely to
give offense.25 The same may be true of one who pretends to be
from an earlier era, although this misrepresentation may be less
offensive in that it does not usurp another's place.26 The author's
STORIES OFNAME CHANGES 199 (1989) (explaining thatJohn Le Carr6 is a pseudonym
for David John Moore Cornwell, who wished to conceal his identity as a British
Foreign Officer when writing spy novels); see also ANONYMOUS, PRIMARY COLORS
(1996) (comprisinga thinly veiled "novel" about President Clinton's campaigning and
advisors written by apparent insider(s)).
24 ThusJohn D. Voelker wrote Anatomy of a Murder based on a case in which he
served as defense counsel. The case took place in 1952; the author was appointed to
the Michigan Supreme Court in 1957; and the book was published under the
pseudonym Robert Traver in 1958. See John D. Voelker Is Dead at 87; Author of
'Anatomy of a Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at B9.25 See e.g., FORREST CARTER, THE EDUCATION OF LITTLE TREE (1976) (describing
the author's childhood in the Tennessee mountains where he was reared as a Native
American by Cherokee grandparents with no connections to the Cherokee Nation).
On the subsequent controversy surrounding the book, see Dan T. Carter, The
Transformation of a Klansman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A31 (revealing Forrest
Carter to be a former Klan member); Felicia R. Lee, Best Seller Is a Fake, Professor
Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at All (same).
2' See David Streitfeld, Spoof, Hoax or Freudian Slip?, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1989, at
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defense is that a reader's biases are exposed by the deception, but
inasmuch as that is true of many successful deceptions it seems fair
to conclude that the cost of deception, in terms of reducing the
value of the signal of (all) authorship, is perceived to exceed the
gain from testing the value of these signals with false signals. We
would not, for example, think much of a doctor or university
student who obtained that position with falsified credentials and
then later explained that the deception was socially beneficial in that
it provided a test of whether the credentials normally required for
the position were sensible ones. Similarly, if an author self-
identifies as a member of a racial, religious, or ethnic group, and
then inspires a reader who genuinely thought that only a real
insider could have provided such a moving tale, the reader may
understandably be wounded by a subsequent revelation that the
author only pretended to be an insider of the kind described. The
author might argue that purer anonymity, which would have left the
reader to wonder whether the author was an insider or not, would
not have tested the reader's preconceptions. But the reader's
response is that signals can be valuable, and that it is the reader's
and not the author's place to decide how much to devalue these
messages in order to test their validity."'
A highly optimistic, but plausible, view of the acceptability of
misleading pseudonyms is that the existing combination of legal and
social norms is sufficiently rich to provide an optimal degree of
signalling and testing. The pretender stands to gain in these
settings so long as no one discovers that the pretender is no
licensed doctor or Native American and so forth." Even a preten-
der who is unmasked may emerge better off than before. There will
therefore be a certain amount of misleading signals in order to sell
books, make a point, or enjoy prestige and celebrity status, as the
case may be. Legal rules will discourage some pretending, with the
sanctions varying according to the expected harm. One who
B5 (reporting that a Yale history professor had written an unidentified work that
appeared to be by a contemporary of Freud's and appeared to buttress positions that
had been advanced by the true author).
2 Of course, we are more sympathetic to undercover police work and other forms
of misleading pseudonymity the more we think that there is a great social gain from
deception and the more we devalue the preferences or costs to the group that is
infiltrated. We would be offended, I think, by the idea of the police infiltrating a
religious hierarchy in order to check for unlikely violations of law.
Note that businesses do occasionally choose to employ experts who will test their
security systems by pretending to be insiders.28 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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pretends to be a licensed surgeon may go to prison, a self-styled
valedictorian and master of unknown languages may be required to
disgorge scholarship money to a duped university,29 while one who
deceives readers and critics as to his membership in a racial or
ethnic group is likely to suffer no legal sanction at all. The relevant
intermediaries may suffer as well: a hospital may be sued or may
lose reputational value for its failure to detect an unlicensed
surgeon in its operating theater, a university may be ridiculed for
giving superior grades to a pretender, and a publisher that plays
along with an author's manipulative deception might suffer
economically."0 In some of these cases, as where a university wins
in court but is ridiculed for its relationship with a con-artist-student,
the "successful" complainant itself suffers some reputational loss-
and this may provide socially useful feedback as to the preconceived
value of signals. More generally, because deception threatens the
value of future signals, most deception is penalized by legal
remedies or social norms or both-although there survives some
incentive to undertake deception that promises private gain and,
perhaps, some socially useful function as well.
c. Signalling and Intermediation
Perhaps the most subtle incentive in these matters is the ex post
judgment of the intermediary. A good example is found in the
practice of "cross-penning" by female authors using male-sounding
pen names. Gross-penning runs in both directions and has
numerous distinct historical contexts and causes, but at least one
" See, e.g., Erin Hallissy, Expelled Yalie Called Victim of Snobbery, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
13, 1995, at A8 (reporting on a student charged with larceny for falsifying admissions
documents); Richard Hoffer, The Great Impostor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,Jan. 15, 1996,
at 76 (reporting on a 30-year-old University of Texas student who faked his identity
in order to play Division I college football); Trickster Who Fooled Princeton University
Receives 9-Month Sentence, Associated Press, Oct. 24, 1992, available in Westlaw, 1992
WL 5322556 (reporting on a student who pled guilty to forging admissions
documents and swindling Princeton out of $22,000 in scholarship money). Students
of contract law have thought about this problem in the context of Roddy-Eden v.
Berle, 108 N.Y.S.2d 597, 599 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Div. 1951), where the court refused to
enforce a ghost-writer's contract when the celebrity-principal decided not to publish
the book.
so It is a bit difficult to imagine a publisher being harmed; I can barely imagine
a class action by misled purchasers of a book. But see Freedman v. Arista Records,
Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (involving a class action attempt by
purchasers of Milli Vanilli albums who claimed to suffer from misrepresentation of
the identity of the singers).
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strand involves the use of male-seeming pen names in order to
overcome preconceptions about the role of women."1 At a superfi-
cial level the deception is harmless and very different from that
discussed in the preceding section because in most cases the author
does not (dishonestly) claim or intend to write from a male
perspective. But of course the very reason for cross-penning may
be that some readers discriminate against female authors because
these readers regard all topics as infused with questions of gender
(albeit in a pre-modern way). My guess is that the social norm takes
account of this by generating a slight preference for anonymity
rather than misidentification. Initials (as in P.D. James) are
preferred to affirmative deception, and the continued presence of
male authors who use their initials provides the necessary camou-
flage.
The intermediary's ex post judgment comes into play as
preferences change. When we look back on an era in which women
cross-penned because there was an insufficient market for books
ostensibly authored by women, we tend to blame the market, which
is to say readers of that time period. We may even glorify the
intermediaries, such as publishers and agents, who helped authors
break or at least evade this cultural barrier. In any event, given our
disapproval of the preferences that generated deception by some
authors and intermediaries, we may even credit successful decep-
tions with changing those preferences expressed in the market. We
may not glorify all deceptions regarding gender, race, religion, and
ethnicity, but we count the deceivers as among the victims.3
2
s One of many well-known examples of cross-penning is Amandine Dudevant's
writing as George Sand. There are also many examples of ambiguous-penning,
discussed presently in the text, including the Brontii sisters' writing as Currer, Ellis,
and Acton Bell. See ROOM, supra note 23, at 89 (quoting Charlotte Bront 's
expression of her fear "that authoresses are liable to be looked on with prejudice"
(citation omitted)). For some additional discussion of the reasons for cross-penning,
seeJoyce C. Oates, Success and the Pseudonymous Writer Turning Over a New Self, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REV., Dec. 6, 1987, at 12; infra note 36.
32 Compare CARTER, supra note 25, with JOHN H. GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1961)
(describing racial prejudice from the point of view of a white journalist, undercover
as a black man, hoping to gain a perspective on racial prejudice). See also Randall
L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1801-02
(1989) (contending that one's status as a member of a racial minority should not be
considered an academic credential) and subsequent criticisms, including Robin D.
Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical
Race Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1864 (1990), Richard Delgado, Mindset and
Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872 (1990), and Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other
Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878 (1990).
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However, hindsight is often not so kind to the nonconformist
instincts of the deceivers. In such cases I would expect the
intermediary to suffer serious reputational loss, and an optimistic
view is, once again, that this threat leaves the system as a whole in
something of a decent equilibrium. Publishers have some incentive
to deceive in order to exploit the (sometimes wrongheaded or
offensive) preferences of readers, but if publishers mispredict future
preferences, they will suffer some loss much as other misrepresenta-
tions are penalized."3 I can barely imagine a world in which
scandals eventually caused publishers and authors to submit their
planned deceptions to a "committee on human experimentation"
because in some sense these deceptions or experiments resemble
other "research" that has come to be constrained by outside reviews.
If the preceding example can be said to represent a case where
the intermediary serves as something of a filter, with a modest
incentive to predict future social preferences correctly, then a
somewhat different analysis is required for the conceptually
troubling (if morally trivial) case where the intermediary actually
corrects a deception or misunderstood signal. One useful and
closely related example concerns the habit of many consumers who
prefer one gender or the other for given services.34 Thus, there
are men who strongly prefer detective novels that are written by
men, and women who prefer such novels that are written by women.
No doubt there are cross-reading preferences as well. It is easy to
imagine that, on average, men and women have different tastes in
character development and plot, and that authors have comparative
advantages, often based on their own gender, in satisfying those
tastes. Over time, and setting aside for an instant the presence of
deceptive claims of authorship, some men may learn that they
generally prefer novels written by men. If as many women as men
It is also interesting to note that the plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), Homer Plessy, was apparently selected as name-plaintiffbecause of his status
as a light-skinned black man. "Because phenotypically Plessy appeared to be white,
barring him from the railway car reserved for whites severely impaired or deprived
him of the reputation of being regarded as white." Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As
Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1747 (1993) (footnote omitted).
" I do not mean to rule out principled publishers suffering the same fate. A
publisher may attempt to defeat readers' preferences because the publisher thinks
them wrong, even though the publisher does not expect to gain from its deception.
" My example continues the focus on the identities of the readers and authors,
but the point is quite general for other services and for other stereotypes or
characteristics. I do not, however, mean to imply that all such examples are equally
acceptable or repugnant.
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read detective novels, if women are as likely to prefer novels written
by women as men are likely to prefer those written by men, and if
there is no shortage of authors of either gender, then there will be
little gain from deception as to an author's sexual identity. Cross-
penning may be fun, but publishers (and authors) will have little
economic incentive to practice this deception because they profit
from matching authors with readers who will like their books.
There may be an occasional author who is better at writing in the
other voice, in a manner of speaking, and in these cases author and
publisher will have an incentive to deceive readers-but most readers
will not be wronged by this signal because the intermediary (and
indeed the communicator) has every incentive to dupe the reader
only insofar as the reader would wish to be duped.
There are, to be sure, weaknesses in this argument about
harmless or even efficient cross-penning. Some readers may value
honesty for its own sake. Others may have a stronger than average
preference and sensibility for authorship of one gender or the
other; the publisher may satisfy the market average, but this reader
may lose because an honest signal as to authorship is especially
valuable to this reader. But these problems seem small compared
to the general point that if we grant some modest assumptions,
intermediaries and authors will engage in a level of deception that
is close to what many of their readers would like. There may be
some overexperimentation, at least from the readers' perspective,
but the market ought to work about as well as it works in most set-
35tings.
Even when we relax some assumptions, so that there is gain to
authors from cross-penning, intermediaries may discourage harmful
deception. If, for example, the buyers of romance novels strongly
prefer female authors (as they seem to), male authors will have an
incentive to cross-pen. Again, so long as there are plenty of female
authors turning out this product, publishers have little incentive to
deceive readers unless their judgment of the actual manuscript is
that it will please the intended audience. I suspect that most
readers would not, ex post, feel wounded by this deception. The
name that appears on the book jacket is thus a socially and
economically constructed signal. "Mary Kingsley" and "Patricia
Grosvenor" are no more deceptive in the romance genre, whether
S' I may go to Macy's because I have come to like their product selection and
displays, and then they may "deceive" me by experimenting with different images.
But on the whole their incentives and mine are fairly well aligned.
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they are really male or female authors, than are Marilyn Monroe,
Mountain Dew, and Hulk Hogan in others.3 6 Entrepreneurs have
every incentive to exploit preferences with these marketing tools,
but inasmuch as they also have incentives to put products in
packages that match consumer expectations, the deception problem
is fairly small.
One nice thing about the role of publisher as intermediary is
that there is little danger of a false intermediary. When one guest
sees another steal from their host, there is the danger that the
informer will be regarded (by the host or a chosen intermediary) as
a suspect. Indeed, the act of communicating may draw attention to
this guest and raise the likelihood that others will think of this
person as the wrongdoer masquerading as a quasi-rescuer. Put
differently, an argument for the anonymity tool in this guest-host-
pilferer setting is that intermediation may do little good. If the
social norm tolerated anonymous communications of this sort
between guest and host, then I would be able to assert that we had
support for the claim that anonymity is more acceptable when more
effective intermediation is unavailable. I have already alluded to the
conclusion that the social norm against anonymity may be over-
broad (assuming that it extends, as I think it might, to this situa-
tion); anonymity would be a useful tool, and in harmony with other
features of our legal and social system, in this guest-host setting. In
contrast, a publisher that distributes novels is obviously not fronting
for itself and is therefore a suitable intermediary with little risk of
casting itself as a suspect. Similarly, the newspapers that published
the Federalist and Antifederalist essays, under names like Publius
and Brutus, were obviously not fronting for themselves.3 7  Pub-
s* Another example is the use of serial-authorship, where one author takes over
from another and signals the continuity of style. There is some deception because
readers might have been preferred to be told that the present author is, for example,
writing in the wake of an earlier casebook author or, more popularly, in the style of
Carolyn Keene, but the publisher has a fairly good incentive to match readers with
styles. See Patricia L. Brown, A Ghostwriter and Her Sleuth: 63 Years of Smarts and
Gumption, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, §4, at 7 (explaining that Mildred Benson was the
original author of the Nancy Drew series under the pen name Carolyn Keene); Susan
Chira, Harriet Adams Dies; Nancy Drew Author Wrote 200 Novels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1982, at Al (discussing how Edward Stratemeyer and later his daughter, Harriet
Stratemeyer Adams, took over the authorship of the Nancy Drew series and
contributed to the Bobbsey Twins series).
7 The authorship of The Federalist Papers seems to have been a well-kept secret at
the time of their publication, and it does appear likely that the editor of the New York
Independent Journal, where the essays appeared, must have known the authors'
identities. SeeJOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 189
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lishers can thus generally serve as effective intermediaries and,
where there is such filtration, the gains from the remaining
anonymity often outweigh the costs. In the case of The Federalist
Papers, for instance, one source of gain was the separation of serious
discourse from interpersonal feelings."8  Moreover, the true
authors were hardly outsiders pretending to be insiders. In the case
of the social guest with a message for the host, anonymity is either
unacceptable or is acceptable only because intermediation is
ineffective. My claim must be that the Federalist cause would have
been damaged if those essays, with authors unidentified, had been
mailed directly to citizens.3
9
II. LEGAL AND SOCIAL NORMS
A. Law's Reluctance Regarding Intermediation
I have operated at a fairly conceptual level thus far in suggesting
(1) that intermediation is sufficiently useful in improving the
tradeoff between chilling and reliability of communications and that
a social norm against direct anonymity may be explained as a means
of encouraging intermediation;" (2) that this social norm, like
most rules, may be somewhat overbroad; (3) that pseudonymity is
more complex when it misleads but that intermediation is a robust
tool in understanding the acceptability of pseudonymous publica-
tions; and (4) that, while consent is a means of understanding some
acceptable anonymity and some intermediation, it is often not easy
to know when and whose consent ought to be implied. I have also
(Greenwood Press 1979) (1959) (discussing the secrecy surrounding the authorship
of The Federalist Papers).
" Excellent sources are cited in Kreimer, supra note 13, at 83 n.229. Such
sensitivities might explain the common practice of pseudonymity in that era, for
"[b]etween 1789 and 1809 no fewer than six presidents, fifteen cabinet members,
twenty senators, and thirty-four congressmen published political writings either
unsigned or under pen names." Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1085 (1961).
" If this is unlikely, then I think it is only because we are more concerned with
free communication than with reliability where political speech is concerned. See infra
notes 50-54 and accompanying text (comparing the Supreme Court's view of
anonymous political speech to other speech).
"' Given the nature of this symposium, I do not address the question of how such
norms might evolve or whether there is even a case to be made for a sociobiological
argument. My own intuition is to think of social practices as developing because of
some function, and then as surviving if this practice is not destructive. This
perspective is reflected in such things as legends of the origins of cuffs on trousers,
buttons on sleeves, or shaking hands when making an acquaintance.
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sought to employ fairly representative and mundane examples of
unidentifiable communications and of "successful" intermediation.
I have not, however, said much about law. Indeed, it is fairly
obvious that in the situations I have discussed where anonymity is
abhorred, it is, nevertheless, with only rare exception, perfectly
legal. The social norms at issue seem to have no more relationship
with legal rules than do the social norms concerning the use of
butter knives and napkin rings. There are, however, a fair number
of legal rules about anonymity. It is thus one of those rich topics
where legal norms are intertwined with social norms. Much as
social norms regarding property rights are of greater interest to
lawyers than those dealing with table etiquette, norms regarding
anonymity will also parallel (and diverge from) the law in interesting
ways.
My claim in this Part is that legal rules reflect the same concerns
about the tradeoff between reliability and chilling effects as do
social norms but that law devalues or often simply cannot accommo-
date intermediation." We might think of intermediation as one
of many mechanisms that thrive in informal contexts, but that are
not easily formalized.
Consider, for example, voting by jurors in criminal and civil
trials. There is again a tradeoff between communication (in terms
of honest revelation rather than quantity) and reliability such that
it is not obvious whether the votes cast by individual jurors should
be discoverable through the polling ofjurors or another procedure.
"' When mass intermediation is logistically impossible, its absence is not
particularly interesting. Thus, anonymous (and critical), or "poison pen," letters are
not illegal in the United States-although they maybe actionable where the threat or
other matter contained would be legally objectionable if made nonanonymously. See,
e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 696 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.
1989) (noting that poison pen letters maligned a company's reputation). Other legal
systems, however, have proposed criminalizing such behavior, although I have not
found a rule where anonymity, as opposed to something like "causing needless
anxiety," was specified as an element of the crime. See, e.g., THE LAW COMMISSION,
CRIMINAL LAW: REPORT ON POISON-PEN LETTERS, Law. Com. No. 147 (1985) (British
law proposal). Even if legal systems can be described as choosing between allowing
and prohibiting anonymous letters, in binary fashion, it is not as if one could easily
provide for intermediation. The volume of anonymous communications, and the
circumstances surrounding each of these, are too great and diverse for the state to
provide some censor or other intermediary. Nor could a serious law require that an
anonymous sender clear the missive with a "suitable intermediary" to be determined
by the sender and then subject to challenge after the fact. In sum, anonymity need
not be allowed, but formal intermediation is nearly impossible;.therefore, the contrast
between legal and social norms may simply follow from pragmatic considerations.
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Anonymity may encourage conscientious voting on the part of a
juror who is freed of peer pressure or even outside influence from
defendants, prosecutors, or litigants. This may even be the case
under a unanimity rule because a nonunanimous vote will then be
impossible to trace, but it is of course more so with a supermajority
voting rule.
The problem with anonymity, however, is that it may facilitate
corruption. If, for example, there are one or two holdouts on ajury
that requires unanimity, or if there is an acquittal by a jury
operating under a supermajority rule, anonymity will complicate
post-verdict inquiries. A prosecutor who looks for evidence ofjury
tampering is assisted by identifiable jury voting, and a juror who
accepts a bribe is empowered by anonymity. In short, anonymity
effects a trade between accountability and honest communication.
Jury voting in American criminal law is normally identifiable-
although in its deliberations the jury might employ secret ballots.
2
Other systems, including American court-martial procedures, opt
for anonymity.43 The conventional wisdom is that this practice
protects junior officers from (formally impermissible) retaliation by
their superiors, but of course this very argument might be used for
42 Most states allow for polling ofjuries, but not polling of grand juries, which
have a tradition of secrecy. See GEORGE EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 70 (1973);
George E. Dazzo, Note, Opening the Door to the Grand Jury: Abandoning Secrecy for
Secrecy's Sake, 3 D.C. L. REV. 139, 139-40 (1995). As for petit juries, only Oregon
limits polling to secret written polls. See State v. Lehnherr, 569 P.2d 54, 56-57 (Or.
Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the Oregon legislature intended to protect the secrecy
and integrity ofjury deliberations). Anonymous juries, with identities undisclosed,
are occasionally used where an unusual fear of retribution is present. See Ephraim
Margolin & Gerald F. Uelman, The Anonymous Juty, 9 CRIM.JUST. 14, 14 (1994).
43 On military law, see Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-Martial Panel Selection Process:
A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103, 127 (1992) (stating that the Code of Militaty
Justice requires supermajority votes for conviction (and unanimity for capital
punishment) and employs secret written ballots, counted by thejunior member of the
panel).
Another example involves the use of the secret ballot in electing member
countries to the Security Council. See Anthony Goodman, Five Countries Elected to
U.N. Security Council, Reuters Ltd., Nov. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. The United Nations has also adopted numerous resolutions advocating
secret ballot elections in its member countries and elsewhere. See, e.g., Enhancing the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, [1991] 45 U.N.Y.B.
588, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 [hereinafter U.N. Voting Resolution] (paying homage
to the principle that different electoral systems are necessary to suit the needs of
different societies but declaring that "the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that every citizen shall have the right to ... vote and be
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot").
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anonymousjury voting more generally. In any event, this variety of
practices regarding juror anonymity is unsurprising given the
plausible advantages of both anonymity and identifiability.
The reader who has come this far might well wonder whether
there is not a role for intermediation in this context. Following the
analysis developed in Part I, the advantages of anonymity and
identifiability might both be enjoyed in a scheme that called for
jurors to record their individual votes with the presiding judge, who
would then report only the aggregate result. If a prosecutor or
other interested party made a plausible claim of tampering or other
corruption, the judge could supervise or unseal and selectively
reveal otherwise unidentifiable votes. The example is far from
perfect for my purposes because, among other things, it is not as if
there is a social counterpart to (the formal law of) jury voting,
where pure anonymity is discouraged in order to channel informa-
tion through an intermediary. Nevertheless, the idea of using an
intermediary to improve the terms of the tradeoff between two aims
or goods is easy to see in this example.
My positive claim with regard to this and similar examples is, I
think, uncontroversial. Making sense of the world it describes will
prove more difficult. The positive claim is simply that, although
there is room for intermediation in order to gain some of the
advantages of anonymity (honest disclosure) without sacrificing too
much in the way of reliability (or corruption), the law is much less
inclined to encourage or legitimate intermediation than is informal
social practice. The law appears to choose between anonymity and
identifiability-although there is some flexibility among encouraging,
mandating, or permitting one or another of these-with little room
for intermediation as a compromise or superior means of combin-
ing the best of both. Social norms may well contemplate and even
encourage intermediation (between an anonymous communicator
and an eager recipient), as explored in Part I, but legal rules seem
more binary in nature.
The binary nature of most laws may have something to do with
the difficulty in tailoring legal arrangements to individual cases.
Social practice does not force guests or authors to communicate
through intermediaries, and it does not force these communicators
to abide by a single convention; each informer is free to decide
whether circumstances call for identifiability or not-and if not,
intermediation may be attractive. In contrast, anonymity and
intermediation will not mean much for a member of a jury unless
fellow jurors do the same. Legal rules may simply be disinclined to
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force some jurors into a method of communication. The difference
between law and social norms with respect to intermediation may
therefore reflect a difference in the range of these two sources of
influence on behavior.
B. Voting Rules, Anonymity, and Intermediation
I have drawn on the example of jury voting because it involves
formal legal rules, variety among these rules regarding anonymity,
and an obvious intermediary in the person of the presiding judge-
although, as we have seen, our legal system does not use this
intermediary as it might to encourage honest revelation. The
example suggests that we turn to voting rules more generally in
order to facilitate a more direct comparison between legal rules and
social norms. Social norms do not govern juries or jury-like
decisionmaking (or perhaps are simply not observed in this context),
it might be said, while voting schemes under law might seem more
fairly comparable to those found in business, collegial, fraternal, or
other "informal" settings.
There is nothing startling about the use and disuse of the
anonymity tool in formal political life, but there is something
puzzling about the comparison between formal voting and informal
voting, by which I mean everything other than the legal norms
governing political decisionmaking. The binary character of the law
with respect to anonymity is plain in the political arena. Anonymity
is exalted and demanded in public elections. The secret ballot has
in a short time44 come close to becoming a universal human
"right"; democracies such as ours insist that it ought to be the legal
norm in all societies.4 5 Anonymity is thus required rather than
44 See L.E. FRIEDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN
REFORM at ix (1968) (teaching that the secret ballot was adopted in Massachusetts in
1888 and in the remaining states during the next fifteen years); see also GEOFFREY
BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF
ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 217-21 (1993).
4 5 See DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPETIVE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 218 (David Butler et al. eds., 1981); see also U.N. Voting
Resolution, supra note 43, at 588 (affirming the importance of secret votes).
It is interesting that where voting is normally open, it concerns policy or
budgetary rather than personnel decisions. See, e.g., VALENTINE HERMAN & FRAN(OISE
MENDEL, PARLIAMENTS OF THE WORLD: A REFERENCE COMPENDIUM 400-11 (1976)
(noting that there is secret voting for the election of many a parliament's president
and for the seating or unseating of a member); Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian
Ecclesia and the Swiss Landsgemeinde, in THE ATHENIAN ECCLESIA: A COLLECTION
OF ARTICLES 207,207-26 (1983). There have also been proposals to use secret ballots
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simply accepted in (the legal rules governing) general elections.
46
In contrast, when voting takes place in representative or delibera-
tive bodies, it is open. The conventional wisdom is that the
secret ballot protects voters against threats and reprisals from
government officials, employers, and the like, while "open govern-
ment" allows voters to monitor their representatives.47 Expanded
into the framework offered in this Article, the conventional wisdom
is that the usual tradeoff between chilling information and reli-
ability, sketched in Part II.A, is here entirely skewed in favor of
anonymity-although the aim must be uncorrupted revelation rather
than more information 4 -because, so long as each eligible citizen
is identified only so far as necessary to guarantee that each will cast
but one vote, there is no further gain to be enjoyed in terms of
"reliability."49 It does not matter which citizen voted for which
in the United Nations. For example, a number of member nations cited "economic
pressure" in pushing for secret ballot on a vote to extend indefinitely the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Evelyn Leopold, Open orSecret Vote? Debate Stymies Nuke
Conference, Reuters World Service, Apr. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
46I should not make too much of the mandatory character of anonymity inasmuch
as social conventions cannot quite match this kind of requirement. On the other
hand, law could make anonymity more optional than it does. It errs on the side of
concern for coercion, as by barring a voter from bringing another adult into a voting
booth, so that the concern about coercion (or identifiability) might require the casting
of an anonymous ballot. That formal legal rules do not go so far where primaries,
party registration, or the very fact of voting is concerned suggests that reliability and
other values are not beyond consideration. See David Lubecky, Comment, Setting
Voter Qualifications for State Primary Elections: Reassertion of the Right of State Political
Parties to Self-Determination, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 799, 824 (1987).
4 7 The case for signed judicial opinions may be the same. On the other hand,
arguments for an independent judiciary cut in favor of permitting anonymity. In
most civil law traditions, judicial opinions are issued anonymously and without
dissents. The variety may have more to do with the taste for strong precedents (and
judges who will feel bound by their earlier work) than with balancing communication
(or honest revelation) and reliability. On judicial opinions, see Ruth B. Ginsburg,
Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 146 (1990). On the tension
between secrecy and disclosure and the application to secret and open voting, see
Kreimer, supra note 13, at 94.
" The evidence seems to be that the secret ballot decreased voter turnout, so it
cannot be said to increase communication in unambiguous fashion. See BRENNAN &
LOMASKY, supra note 44, at 221.
49 And if the system seeks to improve representation by requiring that citizens
vote, identification is easily limited in a way that polices this requirement but protects
the substance of the vote. The only "problem" is that someone who is required to
vote in a democracy (like Australia's) with mandatory voting can simply appear at the
voting place but cast a blank ballot. Given that the point of the mandatory rule is to
combat a collective action problem, there is thought to be no need to require that the
voter choose among the available candidates. Few voters will go to vote and then cast
THE ANONYMITY TOOL
candidate so long as each voted once and the aggregate count is
reliable.
There is nothing necessarily wrong with this wisdom, emphasiz-
ing as it does the familiar goods of honest communication and-
especially in representative assemblies-reliability, but the uniformity
found in these laws is perhaps surprising. There is, for example,
more variety in the law governing anonymous political speech. The
Supreme Court has recently struck down an Ohio statute prohibit-
ing the distribution of anonymous campaign literature," but it is
perhaps just as interesting that most state legislatures have thought
rules requiring some disclosure and accountability were worthwhile
and that many foreign democracies prohibit anonymous political
campaigning as well.51 There are of course reasonable arguments
for and against anonymity;5 2 the point is that we should expect
some variety (and that the relative uniformity of the secret ballot is
therefore surprising) and should take note of the law's disinclination
to compromise by requiring that campaign literature be identifiable
or intermediated."
Secret balloting may be linked to fears of reprisals, but the law
does, of course, permit contributions to political campaigns and
endorsements of candidates, although it might fear reprisals against
those who failed to contribute to or to endorse the right candidate.
a blank ballot. Put differently, the blank ballots that are cast in such a mandatory
system are thought to send a clearer message of protest than do nonvoters in a
system where voting is not required. Citizens who stay home may be lazy (or rational)
rather than communicative. It would, however, be possible to employ an intermedi-
ary in order to accomplish the desired end of extracting an expression of preference
from all eligible citizens. Pious citizens could observe the voting process and prevent
the casting of blank ballots. Logistical problems aside, there is here another modest
example of the idea that legal norms do not much reflect the option of intermedia-
tion.
" See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). The case did
not address those statutes that attempt to regulate only anonymous publication of
derogatory charges against political candidates. See Steven R. Daniels, Recent
Development, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1618, 1618 (1994) (addressing a case upholdinga statute
prohibiting the anonymous publication of derogatory charges); see also Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-66 (1960) (voiding a state statute prohibiting all
anonymous pamphlets).
' See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535-36 (citing statutes in Australia, Canada, and
England); see also Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First
Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 145-50 (1995) (noting that 48 states had statutes
in 1995 requiring the campaign literature to disclose either the author or sponsor's
identity).
'2 The competing arguments concern deterrence of speech on the one hand and
an ability to better evaluate arguments on the other. See Note, supra note 38, at 1084.
" That is, anonymous literature is either permitted or barred.
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Moreover, these donors are required to be identifiable, rather than
anonymous, although there are laws against excessively (or perhaps
notoriously) favoring those who contributed to one's campaign.-
There is therefore something interesting, perhaps even inconsistent,
about the orthogonal arguments for secrecy and openness. It
should not be surprising to find a system that made political
contributions anonymous by channeling them to candidates through
intermediaries or to find a legal regime that used open ballots but
then criminalized reprisals.
That there is, moreover, some loss associated with secret
balloting is plain from an examination of the more arresting puzzle
of why the secret ballot is so uniformly exalted in the law governing
general elections but is only occasionally used in private settings.
Even if we exclude cases where semi-open balloting is accompanied
by confidentiality norms, so that candidates (for office in a club or
class, or for promotion) should not be pained to discover who voted
against them, open ballots are fairly common in social settings
("Which movie shall we rent?"), in faculty meetings, and in
organizations more generally.55 Robert's Rules of Order, for example,
provides for open voting as the default rule and requires not a mere
request but a majority vote to switch to secret ballots.5 6 In the
most informal settings, secret ballots would be something of an
insult, implying fear of reprisals among friends, but in faculty
meetings, for example, the tradeoff between honest communication
and a kind of reliability, or responsibility, is quite evident. Actual
"social" practices are quite mixed. It is common for a faculty
member accustomed to open voting to deride secret ballots,
especially in votes on promotion, as cowardly and dangerously
hospitable to inappropriate motives, while faculty accustomed to
closed voting abhor open voting as an example of overdelegation to
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-82 (1976) (upholding a requirement that
private individuals report contributions to campaigns). Legal rules requiring parade
organizers to register also reflect the absence of the intermediation compromise.
" There may be something of a move toward secret ballots (with purely
procedural "intermediaries") in corporate shareholder voting, but this seems to have
more to do with removing insiders' advantages in assessing ongoing votes and then
bargaining with or pressuring voters (including those who have already submitted
proxies but who can now trump them with later-dated ones). See Carol Goforth, Proxy
Reform As a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too
Little But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379. 460-63 (1994).
5See HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULEs OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED 346-48
(1981). Again, the default seems to switch where interpersonal relations are more
likely at stake, as in elections of officers or new members. See id. at 347.
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committees and unsuitable empowerment of deans and regard it as
adding to the difficulty of maintaining standards of excellence. The
puzzle is that similar arguments do not throw doubt on secret
ballots in general elections. Thus, the phenomenon of African-
American candidates for political office faring better in polls on the
eve of an election, and even in exit polls, than they do in the actual
elections, where the anonymity of the voting booth is available,
might be thought wisely remedied by open voting.5" If there is an
argument for suppressing some deeply held preferences in an
election, then identifiability may be a useful tool, much as anonym-
ity is a useful tool in allowing the expression of deeply held but
publicly unpopular preferences. And if there is no such argument,
perhaps because voting is thought to be synonymous with prefer-
ence revelation, then why are sentiments so different in some
faculty meetings and similar settings?"
The theme offered in this Article about intermediation, and its
important if unstated role in the design of social norms but not in
the structure of legal rules, would be vivid if intermediation were
common in faculty voting or similar decisionmaking.59 Members
might record their votes with an intermediary, such as a faculty
ombudsman, whose opinion of these colleagues might encourage
responsibility on their part. If such intermediation were used to
improve the terms of the tradeoff between communication and
"reliability," then it would be striking that the law chose secret
ballots in general elections and open ballots in representative
assemblies, with nothing in between, while social conventions
developed intermediation where virtually the same tradeoff was at
" See Les Payne, The Lies White Voters Tell to Pollsters, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 12,
1989, at 11, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus Database. But see Thomas B. Rosenstiel,
Inaccurate Poll Results Laid to Bad Polling, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, A28
(commenting on elections in New York and Virginia "where polls put black candidates
much further ahead than they actually were" and noting that since the majority of
"undecided" voters were whites contemplating cross-racial voting, the polled voters
were not necessarily lying). For other examples and for discussion of the implications
of this occurrence, see Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public
Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 734 (1991) (discussing the motivations
of anonymous voters and the likelihood that anonymity would generate legislation
disadvantaging racial minorities).
" One can barely imagine a wedding at which the minister suggests, "Let anyone
who knows a reason why this couple should not be wed surreptitiously pass me an
anonymous note."
" I focus on faculty voting because it is familiar to many readers, and I apologize
to those who think that social norms that develop in a nonprofit or insular setting are
likely to be unrepresentative.
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issue. The actual evidence is, of course, much less striking than it
might have been. The variety found with respect to open and secret
balloting in informal settings is helpful, as is the practice of open
voting accompanied by confidentiality with regard to persons
outside the decisionmaking group. An optimist might say that the
group is the intermediary. There is also something of a practice of
registering dissenting views with the dean or chair before a faculty
meeting, and this too might be seen as intermediation of the kind
introduced in Part I. Finally, there are some interesting anecdotes,
or perhaps outliers, that suggest the utility and acceptability of
intermediation where social norms govern. One example captures
the flavor of these developments. A law faculty which prides itself
on collegiality, and virtually always votes openly, 6 engaged in a
search for a new dean. After two outside candidates were inter-
viewed, and several insiders considered, the search committee
divided up the resident faculty in random fashion and set about to
interview every faculty member with the understanding that
preferences (not to mention intensities) could be made confidential
between the interviewee and committee member. The method is
likely to promote anonymous or even confidential6l communica-
tions as compared to open voting at a meeting where the under-
standing is that there is to be no discussion with outsiders or with
the candidates themselves. The presence of a single intermediary
makes it easier to trace any breaches of confidentiality. This sort of
intermediation seems to invite rather than taint anonymity because
there is some check on reliability and motives. It offers a compro-
mise between communication and reliability precisely where the
group is likely to have the greatest anxieties about hurt feelings and
retribution, whether conscious or otherwise, after a new dean is
elected. The emergence of this polling method may illustrate the
tolerance in social practice, as opposed to law, for anonymity where
reliability can be preserved.
' It is interesting that the same faculty opted for secret ballots, in the interest of
"honest preference" revelation, when there was a call for a resolution regarding
divestment from South Africa-related investments in the early 1980s. It is interesting
that anonymity emerged where the vote concerned something less rather than more
professional.
" "Confidentiality" is taken to mean that the substance of a communication is not
to be transmitted by the recipient, while "anonymity" means that the informer's non-
identifiability is to be preserved while the substance of the communication may be
broadcast further.
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In sum, voting law and practices offer interesting clues about
law, social norms, and intermediation. My suggestion has been that
law chooses between anonymity and identifiability, depending on
lawmakers' assessment of the tradeoff between revelation and
reliability, with little appetite for intermediation as a means of
improving the terms of this tradeoff. In contrast, social norms
wield the anonymity tool in a way that is sensitive to the value of the
companion tool of intermediation. This story has the ring of truth
where voting rules are concerned, but it is hardly a neat account.
There are at least two reasons for the untidiness. First, if we have
correctly identified the tradeoff between anonymity and identifiabil-
ity, there is something surprising about the uniformity of the secret
ballot in general elections. As discussed earlier, this is especially
puzzling given the variety found in private voting contexts, even
where intermediation is out of the picture.
The second complicating factor is that it is impossible to
make much of the lack of intermediation in general elections
because practical problems can on their own explain (not the
uniformity of secret balloting but) the absence of intermediation.
In most general elections there is no feasible intermediary to
encourage responsible voting. The intermediary needs to be
reliable with confidences and sufficiently authoritative or res-
pectable to bring out the best rather than the worst in voters.
The more awesome the figure, the less it is necessary for the
communicator to be known to the intermediary or to expect
repeat interaction, but a remote figure creates logistical prob-
lems where thousands or millions of voters are concerned. For
many voters, a local pastor might advance the goal of honest
communication salted with some notion of responsibility or
reliability. But many pastors will have their own agendas, and
their very presence would be counter to our notions of separat-
ing church and state. We might pine for the grade school class-
room, where voting for class monitor called for closed eyes
with heads face down on the desks, and where hands were raised
under the teacher's (and one or two cheaters') watchful eyes, but as
a practical matter our general elections must either be open or
closed, with no such intermediation. There may be something of a
surprise in the uniformity we find, but given a stark choice between
open and closed voting it is surely not irrational for any given set of
lawmakers (or voters) to choose the secret ballot for its general
elections, but then open, identifiable voting in its representative
bodies.
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C. Legal Intermediation
1. Judges and Secrets
The quixotic search for an intermediary in general elections,
along with the suggestion in Part II.A thatjudges could intermediate
in jury voting, draws attention to those few areas where judges are
called on to intermediate-in the sense of preserving some degree
of anonymity in order to encourage communication while preserv-
ing reliability. The best and most familiar examples may be the role
of the judiciary in preserving national secrets or other sensitive
information in such things as lawsuits involving government
decisions, including requests under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).62 When a judge is entrusted with a requested document
in order to ascertain whether it falls under one of the Act's exemp-
tions,' the judge's role is one of intermediation. If the law had
been unwilling to use judges in this manner, it is quite likely that it
would have given citizens less power to extract information because
fears of important breaches would have loomed larger. Intermedia-
tion thus encourages communication. It may also encourage
reliability because government officials are more likely to respond
to requests for information with complete and unfalsified docu-
ments if they know that judges will monitor their compliance.
Similarly, there is room in our legal system for anonymous
litigation where disclosure threatens serious harm.' To the
62 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (guaranteeing
access to government records unless specific exemptions apply). Pursuant to
§ 552(a)(3), government records not covered by specific exemptions must be made
available upon receiving a request made in accordance with the regulations. See
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY ACT, topic 4 (Allan Adler ed., 19th ed.
1995).
s' Sections 552(b)(1)-(9) of the statute provide for specific exemptions (including
national security, internal agency documents, specific statutory prohibitions, and
other personnel and business-related confidential records) where an agency may in
its discretion decline to provide information to the requestor. After exhausting an
administrative appeal, the requestor may appeal the denial of information to the
district court. In deciding whether the denial was justified, the court may rely upon
the agency's record and affidavits, or may in its discretion conduct an in camera
review of the requested documents. See § 552(a)(4)(B) (stating that district courts
"shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency
records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
withheld"); cf. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242-43 (1978)
(holding that the NLRB could withhold releasing witness statements because they
would interfere with upcoming enforcement proceedings).
" See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1981) (entitling plaintiffs to
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extent that the plaintiff's true identity is known only to the court,
or even to all parties but not to the public, there exists another
example of (nonbinary treatment and) intermediation in legal
rules.
65
These relatively unusual examples illustrate (by counterexample)
the law's general reluctance regarding intermediation.' Judges
could be (but are overwhelmingly not) used where social norms hint
that intermediation is valuable. If an employee approaches an
employer, or even a union representative, with a complaint about
a fellow employee, we expect the authority figure-who in many
ways has the power of ajudge-often to counsel silence or to explain
why the complaint is better not pursued. The legal system could in
similar fashion allow complaints to be filed privately, with judges
advising or insisting that some of these complaints be made public
while others be dropped quietly. In the absence of such intermedia-
tion, complainants seek advice from lawyers, but agency costs may
lead to much more openness and litigation than judge-based
intermediating systems would generate.
It is noteworthy that even where we do use judges as inter-
mediaries, as in the FOIA example above, we often instruct our
judges to be general or rigid and not as sensitive to the facts of
proceed anonymously in "challenging the constitutionality ofprayer and Bible reading
exercises in Mississippi public schools"). But cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (requiring that
the caption of a filing contain parties' names). See generally Joan Steinman, Public
Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities
Confidential?, 37 HAsTINGs L.J. 1, 3 (1985) (proposing "a detailed analytical approach
for courts to use in determining when pseudonymity should be permitted in civil
actions").
6 Note that parties may be ordered (under threat of criminal sanctions) not to
reveal information outside of court. See e.g., University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182
(1990) (dealing with reviews of an employee's work). The discussion here approaches
the fine line between secrecy in law and the narrower question of anonymous
communications. See Benjamin S. DuVal,Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. Pr. L.
REV. 579, 579 (1986) (arguing "that there are a number of good reasons for
restricting the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge and that government does
restrict the dissemination of information in a variety of ways in a great number of
situations"); Kreimer, supra note 13, at 25-71 (discussing the potential for the
disclosure of information to serve as a sanction).
" This binary character of the law leads to its share of litigation and fine lines.
Thus, a statute aimed at prohibiting the wearing of masks by terrorizing groups was
upheld in State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990). The statute provided an
exception for "legitimate" mask wearing, as on holidays or for job safety or as part
of theatrical costumes or medical treatment. See id. at 549. A similar statute,
however, was struck down in Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813,819 (Ct.
App. 1978). A less "legal" resolution of the problem would bar masks that had not
been approved (for the given person wearing it) by a suitable intermediary.
1996] 2227
2228 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 2191
the particular case as a private intermediary would be. Thus,
it might be sensible for a judge to weigh not only a govern-
ment agency's need for secrecy but also the gain to a citizen
from obtaining the information requested. Organized crime is
said, for example, to make requests for information under the
FOIA, but judges are supposed to decide upon these requests by
evaluating only the scope of the legislative exemptions and not
the likely uses to which the requested information will be put.6"
Put in the framework advanced in this Article, our law again
chooses between the extremes of anonymity and identifiability.
Here, the requester can remain anonymous (if only by using an
attorney), although it is easy to imagine a system where that
would not be the case. More generally, although we are in the
habit of describing legislation as prospective and broadly aimed,
and our judiciary as retrospectively working on a case-by-case
basis, these examples remind us (as if we needed more reminding)
that our judges are asked to do their share of general lawmaking
with little attention to the justice, costs, and benefits of the
particular case.
2. Judicial Evaluation of Anonymous Information
One obvious source of examples of acceptable anonymity with
greater particularized attention to facts is in the triggering of
criminal investigations. Unsolicited information, or tips, can be
used (and indeed are even encouraged with rewards) to obtain
search warrants, to conduct tax audits, and so forth.' It is
tempting to think of these as examples of intermediation of the kind
I have associated with social practice much more than with legal
rules because it is often the case that the informant is known to the
6 7 Panel Probes Lawyers' Roles in Organized Crime, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 24, 1984, at 33
(noting the use of FOIA requests to thwart enforcement proceedings against
organized crime). Nevertheless, "[t]he law makes it clear that persons seeking
information no longer have to state a reason." Freedom of Information Act
Compilation and Analysis, House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1968); see also Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
the FOIA statutory exemptions allowing the FBI to refuse to disclose); Baez v. United
States Dept. ofJustice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).
' See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-46 (1983) (allowing the use of an
anonymous letter, accompanied by corroborating circumstances, to satisfy the "totality
of circumstances" test for probable cause). Anonymous tips can also trigger the
investigations more generally, but since my focus here is on law's receptivity to
anonymity, I concentrate on legal rules (rather than the practices of law enforcement
officials).
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judge or other government official but not to the subject of the
information or investigation. On the other hand, our legal rules
permit the judge or other official to proceed on the basis of purely
anonymous information; in other settings it is the fact that the
informer is revealed to the intermediary that makes the residual
anonymity acceptable. A search warrant, for example, may be
obtained on the basis of a purely anonymous tip that suggests some
reliability because of its context or because of information transmit-
ted along with reports of the subject's wrongdoing. Identifiable
communicators will normally appear more reliable than anonymous
informers do to the investigators or to the magistrate deciding
whether to issue a warrant. As such, the legal official's role involves
a kind of intermediation, but it is fair to say that the law again
chooses between anonymity or not-and here it allows anonymity-
but it allows a legal official to assess the loss in reliability. Neverthe-
less, because informants' identities are sometimes made known to
judges but then put under seal, there is here at least a solid example
of intermediation under law as a means of improving the terms of
the tradeoff between communication and reliability.
69
Some legal systems place limitations on the use of anonymous
communications in police investigations."0 Those systems might
even more clearly be seen as choosing between anonymity and
identifiability, with no room for intermediation as a means of
gaining the best of both worlds.
69 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.4 (1975) provides that the
identity of an undisclosed informant be revealed to the other party unless the judge
determines that "there is substantial corroboration of the informant's existence and
reliability" and the issue whether there existed reasonable cause to act based on an
informant's tip "can be fairly determined without such disclosure." Thejudge may
require the prosecution to disclose the informant's identity to the court for purposes
of making this determination. The information, if deemed to be confidential, must
be kept under seal and transmitted to the appellate court in the event of appeal.
'0 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice As a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?,
78 CAL. L. REv. 539, 578 n.184 (1990) (noting the French supreme judicial court's
holding "that an anonymous telephone call does not provide sufficient basis.., to
invoke the 'flagrant offense' doctrine," which would allow police to search the scene
of the offense and domiciles of all the individuals who appear to have participated in
the offense without a warrant).
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3. Criminal Law and Intermediation
a. Investigation Versus Adjudication
The inclination of some legal systems to balance communication
and reliability in a way that leads to the rejection of anonymous tips
as a means of triggering some kinds of government investigations
suggests that it might be useful to think about our own system's
similar preferences in criminal trials. This is not the place to
examine the law arising out of the Confrontation Clause, but
generally speaking our legal system is much less tolerant of
anonymity at trial than in investigation.7 1 A criminal defendant can
better prepare a defense if the accuser, victim, and witnesses are
identified than if some of these players are not. A concern for
avoiding mistaken criminal convictions also leads to an emphasis on
reliability rather than marginal communications. Cross-examining
a witness or accuser is thus taken to be an important step toward
reliability, so that anonymity is normally barred.
This line between investigation and trial, defining as it does
where anonymity is tolerated, is more arbitrary than it first seems.
And much as there are principled legal systems that demand
identifiability as a precursor to invasive searches, so too there are
respectable legal systems that permit anonymous accusers all the
way through to conviction.72 The possibility of anonymity will
71 The right to confront witnesses dates back at least to the Roman era where the
right was noted at the sedition trial of the Apostle Paul, although it is commonly
thought that the abuses of the infamous Star Chamber of sixteenth-century England
(and the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh) provoked its wide acceptance into Anglo-
American law. See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser.
Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 481,482
(1994) (finding that, while "[c]onventional wisdom marks Raleigh's rejected demand
[to meet the witness against him face to face] as the starting point in the history of
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause .... the right of confrontation ...
reaches back far beyond Raleigh's trial"); see alsoJencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
668 (1957) (requiring a prosecutor to provide witness statements to the defense);
Alfredo Garcia, The Sixth Amendment in Modern AmericanJurisprudence,'in CONTRIBU-
TIONS IN LEGAL STUDIES 73-74 (1992) (discussing the origins of the Confrontation
Clause).
' But the variety is dwindling. See EC: European Court Law Report-Conviction on
Basis ofAnonymous Witnesses'Evidence Against Convention, Times-Reuters Textline, Nov.
22, 1989. The Czech Republic's criminal law recently ended reliance on anonymous
witnesses. See Czech Republic: InteriorMinister Condemns Court's Decision on Anonymous
Witnesses, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Textnws File.
On the other hand, the Australian Supreme Court recently upheld a convic-
tion based on anonymous testimony, stating "the protection of undercover
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surely bring forth some reporting of crime and some witnesses that
would otherwise be chilled. Plainly, this tolerance of anonymity
must be accompanied by greater use of intermediation. Judges or
even nonadversarial prosecutors might be used to question
witnesses or simply to assess the prejudice suffered by the defendant
who is unable to confront his or her accuser. In this case, it is our
legal system that makes less room for intermediation, and chooses
most bluntly between pure anonymity and identifiability. When the
choice is put this way, the preference for identifiability is easy to
defend.
b. Government As Intermediary
The value of confrontation and the true role of intermediation
in a legal system is, however, made much more complicated by the
role legislated for the government in serving as accuser and victim,
and by the role government often plays as intermediary. A
defendant who pollutes a river may be convicted under a criminal
statute, even though there is no private accuser and no immediately
identifiable victim. A landlord may be convicted of discriminatory
practices and a drug dealer may be convicted of selling a controlled
substance on the basis of behavior toward government agents who
"test" the defendant on behalf of real citizens. These undercover
agents begin pseudonymously, but even once they are identified we
might best think of them as intermediaries. They operate where
private accusers might be chilled and they are less easily intimidated
by threats of reprisals. Meanwhile, their deployment sacrifices
something in the way of reliability if only because there is always the
question of entrapment, or simply a kind of incremental activity-
level question. Our system's disinclination to use intermediation in
order to permit anonymous accusers at trial might thus be described
as camouflaging its willingness to use intermediation in the def-
inition and development of criminal offenses. Defendants as a
group might well prefer a system that sacrificed some of their ability
to confront identifiable accusers in return for something of a ban
on pseudonymous "testing" by the government.
73
police officers should be recognized as a basis for the grant of public interest
immunity." David Saunders, Australia: Court Upholds Appeal on Secrecy of Police
Undercover Identities, Reuter TextlineJuly 28,1994, available in LEXIS. News Library,
Txtnws File.
s I call it pseudonymous because the undercover agent attempts to mislead as to
his or her true identity even if there is no explicit use of a false name.
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Once we think of criminal law in terms of tradeoffs between
communication (or simply the reporting of crimes) and reliabil-
ity, various compromises, including several kinds of interme-
diation, catch our interest. Variety among legal systems is easy
to understand, and doctrinal distinctions within any one sys-
tem seem somewhat arbitrary. The matter is further complicated
by the availability of other tools with which to encourage com-
munication. Thus, rewards can be offered to encourage communi-
cation-but then these rewards often cast doubt on the reliability
of the information. The optimal combination of anonymity,
intermediation, and rewards is surely difficult to ascertain.
74
My suggestion here can only be that anonymity is a potentially
useful tool, best understood as an alternative to the following:
less communication that is on average more reliable; more com-
munication that is on average even less reliable-because it is
financially rewarded; and somewhat less communication that is,
however, somewhat more reliable-because it is filtered through a
reliable intermediary.
It is also the case that government often serves as an unoffi-
cial intermediary. Neighbors might call the police or other
local officials in order to avoid direct confrontations regarding
such things as noise, property usage, parenting behavior, and
even aesthetics. Such examples blur the line between legal
and social norms. In turn, my claim that social norms are more
flexible than legal institutions in allowing for the advantages
of intermediation is weakened by the idea that there is no firm
line between the two sources of rules. On the other hand, it
is arguable that social practices lead to intermediation as a matter
of course, and that it is simply the case that actors will turn
to available intermediaries who will sometimes be found in what is,
after all, the large public sector.
7' It is difficult to ascertain in the rules governing finders because rewards
generate moral hazard problems. Here the problem is with accuracy, or the moral
hazard of wrongful conviction or acquittal, rather than with the moral hazard of
generating additional crimes.
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D. Blending Law and Norms
1. Legal Regulation of "Normal" Intermediaries
Immunities and privileges available under legal rules for family
members, clergy, doctors, and lawyers say more about first-party
advice than third-party communication. Thus, a willingness on the
legal system's part to protect communications between an individual
and a priest has more to do with leaving space for religious rituals
and obligations, and perhaps with facilitating self-help, than it does
with protecting intermediaries who may be used to transmit
information to third parties.7 5 Nevertheless, these very counselors
my be turned into filters. They often serve a community that
includes both a communicator, who wishes to be anonymous, and
the subject or ultimate recipient of that communication. The legal
rules that support or even encourage confidential communications
to certain persons are in this way likely to promote the sort of
intermediation discussed in this Article. Of course, to the extent
that the best-placed intermediaries are outside this group, the law
might be said to discourage or to regulate intermediation because
in the rare cases where legal processes become relevant, the
intermediary who was approached with the expectation of confiden-
tiality may be legally unable to abide by that expectation or social
norm.
Perhaps the best example of this sort of intermediation that
arises without much regard to legal rules, but is then regulated by
law, is found in journalism. Reporters often agree to protect their
sources, editors may require more than one source in order to
improve the reliability of unattributed information, and informers
often seek out reporters not only because their views or complaints
will be transmitted effectively but also because they will be broad-
cast without attribution. The strong social norm against sending
critical, anonymous notes exists alongside an equally strong norm
glorifying journalists and their anonymous sources who criticize and
even threaten subjects. Legal rules promote this sort of intermedia-
tion in several related ways. Most notably, journalists will normally
be protected by a constitutional privilege from defamation suits
brought under a strict liability rule; they are more strongly pro-
5 See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1450 (1985) (discussing the history and implications of privileges for attorney-client,
medical, counseling, familial, and institutional relationships).
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tected (because plaintiff must show "actual malice") where they can
claim that the information was about a public matter and a public
or official figure. 6 And as for their specific roles as intermedi-
aries, "shield laws" often protect journalists from revealing their
sources.7
Although journalism offers another nice example of intermedia-
tion as a means of improving the terms of the tradeoff between
encouraging information and preserving reliability, it is also an
example of the way that the choice of intermediaries may be a
function of legal rules. But this interaction between legal rules and
social norms means that there is no clear line between these rules
and norms. Fortunately, little that I have said suffers from the
deconstruction which may follow from this observation. Formal law
seems relatively disinclined to assign intermediating tasks to its
officials. Where there is a good deal of regulation in the back-
ground, so that formal law is hard to separate from social norms
because each develops in light of the other, it becomes impossible
to say whether one "sector" is more inclined than the other to
anticipate or encourage intermediation.
2. Intermediation in the Shadow of the Law
Interdependence between private practices and legal rules also
develops when private parties are threatened by legal regulation.
Norms that arise in this manner may go beyond where legal rules
could have gone in constitutional or other terms. This sort of
evolution is common where communications are concerned. Thus,
the film industry may agree on a rating system, and television and
music producers may converge on norms regarding nudity and
obscenity, because of the uncertainty and threat value of legal
regulation. There is a different kind of intermediation in many of
these developments, as when an industry establishes standards and
a board of review, but the point of an "independent" reviewer may
be to gain reliability without much suppression of communication.
Similar developments surround anonymous communications.
Many universities have rules requiring an official to approve all
posted signs. These rules hint at the preference for intermediation
76 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
See Leslye deRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Casefor a FederalJournalist's
Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 779, 796-97 (1991) (noting the
variety of protections for sources offered by different state shield statutes).
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over complete (and sometimes "irresponsible") anonymity, but they
may also prevent involvement in litigation over hate speech and the
like. Internet access services may censor or terminate the accounts
of customers who send offensive materials, or they may intermedi-
ate on the receiving end of such materials received in mass
electronic mailings from outside sources. These services may simply
respond to market preferences or they may be designed to preempt
legal regulation (which may or may not be constitutionally feasi-
ble)." Similarly, it is possible that the development of "caller
identification" technology was influenced by the social norm
against-and the threat of legal regulation to control-anonymous
telephone calls. Remarkably, the case-by-case flexibility of the social
norm is preserved by the availability of "per call blocking;" cus-
tomers can see the number from which an incoming call has been
made, but the caller can also block the recipient from gaining this
information. In turn, the recipient will know that information
about the source of an incoming call has been blocked. This offers
a kind of consent option, analogous to receiving a letter which says
"do not open unless you consent to receive an anonymous let-
ter." It is especially difficult to unpackage such evolving market-
place norms from the regulatory and litigation environments in
which they develop.
CONCLUSION
Most of us participate rather frequently in institutional arrange-
ments that involve anonymous communications. But most of us
have few experiences with sending or receiving critical, anonymous
communications to or from coworkers, neighbors, students, and so
8 Anonymous letters and phone calls are not per se legally objectionable (in most
places), but there is the sense that communication over the Internet can reach many
more people at much lower cost and thus advantages the sender at the expense of
many recipients. Moreover, senders can gain anonymity by using "re-mailers" that
forward electronic mail with no trace of the author's identity. These re-mailers do
no filtering and are therefore not intermediaries as that term has been used in this
Article. See generally I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regimefor "Cyberspace*, 55 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 993 (1994) (discussing various cybcrspace issues and the proper
methods of regulation).
" The consent is not entirely flawed by the "offer" itself because customers are
also offered the option of simply rejecting all anonymous calls. See USA: NewJersey
Bell to Introduce Additional Capabilities, PR Newswire, June 23, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Finnws File (reporting NewJersey Bell's decision to offer "Per
Call Blocking" and "Anonymous Call Rejection"). Determined callers can of course
defeat the innovation by using public telephones.
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forth. Social practice discourages these communications, and I have
suggested that it does so in part because communication through
intermediaries generally dominates direct, anonymous communica-
tion. I have also suggested that legal rules incline toward a different
and more limited role for intermediation.
My intuition is that there is something unsettling about the
binary reaction of law toward anonymity. The secret ballot is
glorified, but in many states voters in primaries must openly state
their party affiliations and identifiable signatories are required to
put a new candidate on the ballot."0 We pride ourselves on
allowing defendants to confront their accusers but we invade
privacies on the basis of anonymous tips and regularly use our
government as an impersonal accuser. In these and other areas we
may be missing something by not thinking through our own social
practices.
' The majority of states have closed primary systems, which require voters to
sacrifice some degree of anonymity by registering their party affiliation prior to a
primary election. There is, however, the possibility that a party will permit
"independents" to vote in its primary. See Republican Party v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
267, 286 (2d Cir. 1985) (ruling that the Republican party has a right to permit
independents to participate in its primary and enjoining the enforcement of
Connecticut's closed primary statute), aff'd 479 U.S. 1049 (1986). Statutes calling for
dosed primaries are usually justified as an effort to prevent "party raiding," the
practice of voting for an opposing party's weaker candidate to increase the chances
of one's own candidate to win the general election. Some states employ either an
open (where voters choose a party slate at the polls) or blanket (where voters may
vote for either party for each office) primary system. See Lubecky, supra note 46, at
800.
